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Abstract 
In response to mounting charges of not representing labour market ‘outsiders’, and to the 
emergence of alternative actors, trade unions have stepped up their claim to be 
representative of all workers, without distinction. The paper reviews the theoretical and 
policy debates on the representation of precarious workers and detects an under-
theorisation of what representation is based on. To fill this gap, we draw on Saward's (2010) 
concept of 'representative claims' to analyse the different grounds for the competing 
assertions of representativeness. Four main forms of claims are identified and illustrated 
through empirical examples. The paper concludes that these different claims are mutually 
reinforcing in stimulating attention to the outsiders, and, in their interaction with institutional 
settings, have a performative effect in defining new social actors.  
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Introduction 
The issue of labour market dualisation has become central for industrial relations over the last decade, 
especially in Europe (e.g. Emmenegger, 2014; Prosser, 2018). While divisions within the working 
class have always been known, recent developments have made them more manifest: uneven effects 
of the economic crisis, urban riots, protest votes, new social movements have questioned the capacity 
of western societies to provide representation and expression channels for the social groups that feel 
most affected by economic uncertainty. Consequently unions have developed a variety of 
revitalization strategies to face issues of uneven representation, and in particular the unionization gaps 
between groups of the workforce (Doellgast et al., 2018; Grimshaw et al., 2016; Keune, 2013; Keune 
and Pedaci, 2019). At the same time, new actors have emerged to represent precarious workers, with a 
variety of relations (collaborative, competitive etc.) with traditional trade unions. Interestingly, we 
note that alongside these new forms of representation, governments and employers have increasingly 
used the argument that their own policies and practices are in the real interests of outsiders. 
This article provides theoretical reflection on the widely encountered claim that dualisation derives 
from uneven representation in trade unions and policy making of disadvantaged groups (outsiders) in 
comparison to insiders (Palier and Thelen, 2010). It identifies an insufficient theorisation of the 
concept of representation in the existing debates on insiders and outsiders. By applying reflections 
from political sociology and political philosophy, and in particular Saward’s (2010) concept of the 
‘representative claim’, we explain the rise of concerns about dualisation and the ‘representation of the 
unrepresented’ across disparate employment and industrial relations regimes. The interpretative and 
analytical gains of studying representative claims with regard to marginal categories of workers is 
then illustrated through examples mainly from across Europe, and looking more closely at the three 
labour markets of the UK, Germany and Italy (chosen for their diversity and size), showing how 
heterogeneous claims have emerged and co-evolved in the last decade.  
 
Labour market dualisation and representation 
Issues of labour market dualization and precariousness have been discussed since the 1970s, but 
become more prominent following the crisis of 2008 (Kalleberg, 2018, Emmenegger et al., 2012, 
Standing, 2011, Thelen, 2014). Divides in the labour market in terms of vulnerability are increasingly 
manifest, especially in Europe, where the status of employee has been protected by a long history of 
industrial citizenship (Streeck, 1987; Castel, 1995) and workers on atypical contracts (agency 
workers, zero-hour contracts etc.) have suffered disproportionately from the recent economic crisis. 
Standing (2011) has called this group a new class, the ‘Precariat’, distinct from the core ‘Salariat’. In 
policy, the European labour market is increasingly portrayed as divided between insiders and 
outsiders. In the words of the European Central Bank’s President, Mario Draghi (11th March 2016):  
In many countries the labour market is set up to protect older ‘insiders’ – people with permanent, 
high-paid contracts and shielded by strong labour laws. The side-effect is that young people are 
stuck with lower-paid, temporary contracts and get fired first in crisis times.  
While there is a broad consensus on the existence of a labour market divide, opinions differ deeply on 
the causes and, relatedly, the solutions. Within a diverse and fluid debate, we distinguish three 
different broad analytical approaches which make different assumptions on the role of representation 
in the emergence of labour market division. For reasons of focus we do not include here accounts of 
labour market dualisation which find explanations on the supply side (e.g. gender and ethnic 
approaches) because, while making important contributions to the understanding of specific forms of 
inequality in the labour market and in organisations, they do not provide generally applicable 
arguments on the role of representation. 
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Segmentation theory emerged in the 1970s and is employer-centred in its explanatory construct 
(Doeringer and Piore, 1971). The theory stipulates that, when industrial change shifts the focus of 
comparative advantage to flexibility and rapid market adaptation, employers respond by segmenting 
their workforces creating a protected, committed core and a flexible, disposable periphery. 
Segmentation is thus expected to be strongest where industrial change is faster and, in particular, 
where employers have more discretionary power to determine terms and conditions of employment. 
Conversely, strong employment protection legislation and powerful, encompassing trade unions, by 
restraining employer freedom, should limit dualization by enforcing equal treatment and more 
security across all sections of the labour market. This argument converges with that of power resource 
theory, according to which labour political power leads to more egalitarian outcomes (Korpi, 1983). 
Insider-outsider theories became more prominent from the 1990s onwards and, while superficially 
sharing some similarities with segmentation theory, make opposite predictions. Most specifically, the 
politics-based version elaborated by Rueda (2007) stipulates that social-democratic governments 
prioritize the interests of labour market insiders, and notably those represented by trade unions whose 
support is electorally crucial. While increasing protection for the insiders, they reduce employment 
opportunities for the outsiders, by depressing labour market demand and constraining the flows 
between employment and unemployment. Even if the proponents of this theory are keen on avoiding 
determinism in political preferences (Lindvall and Rueda, 2014), the underlying prediction is that 
where social-democratic parties – and by extension, trade unions – are strongest, the insider-outsider 
divide will be sharper. This interpretation has been increasingly endorsed by international economic 
organizations including the OECD (2010) and European Commission (2010).  
Between these approaches we can find a range of institutionalist arguments focusing on more nuanced 
political factors, especially institutionalized rules, rather than simple party politics. Whereas 
institutional scholars may disagree on a number of evaluations and explanations, the majority 
associate labour market problems such as segmentation with ‘hybrid’ institutional settings that fail to 
develop clear comparative advantages. In contrast to both segmentation theories that blame excessive 
employer freedom, and insider-outsider theorists that blame excessive trade union power, 
institutionalist analyses have generally identified the mid-way cases as the worst situations, where 
institutions are strong enough to protect some workers, but too weak to protect all (Calmfors-Driffill, 
1988; Hall and Soskice, 2001). Institutional contributions interestingly concur that more mixed 
institutional settings produce sub-optimal results in comparison to the more neoliberal ones, which at 
least foster high employment rates for most people, and social-democratic ones, which provide better 
job quality for more people (Crouch, 2015; Thelen, 2014). A specific argument in support of this 
prediction has been provided by Palier and Thelen (2010), according to whom trade unions do try to 
defend all workers, but when they start losing power have to retreat to the defence of the core as a 
least-worst option. 
The approaches discussed above differ in their policy recommendations and in their predictions of 
how labour markets react to regulation, and in particular to union representation and collective 
bargaining. Although a large literature is emerging on testing such predictions (Benassi and Vlandas 
2016; Benassi et al., 2016; Keune, 2013; Emmenegger et al., 2012; Prosser, 2015; Advagic, 2015; 
Fervers and Schwander, 2015; Thelen, 2014), the conceptual aspect of representation has received 
little to no attention. The question which has not been considered is whether, and in what sense, trade 
unions represent all workers (as generally assumed by segmentation scholars), only the insiders (as 
argued by insider-outsider theorists), or the insiders directly, and the outsiders only when convenient, 
as implicit in most institutionalist arguments? 
Most approaches tend to have rather rigid assumptions with regard to the preferences and 
representation of actors and groups, whether employers, insiders and outsiders, or demographic 
groups. Yet it is empirically questionable whether insiders and outsiders see themselves as such, or, in 
other words, whether the Precariat is a ‘class for itself’ in addition to an emerging ‘class in itself’ 
(Standing, 2011). In the USA, Milkman and Ott (2014) have detected complex and ambivalent 
relations between, on the one hand, traditional union organizing and, on the other, workers’ centres, 
indicating a deep heterogeneity in the ‘Precariat’.  
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To address the question of the link between representation and dualisation, a reflection on the 
meaning of ‘representation’ is needed. Despite the well-known differences in systems of employee 
representation, labour market institutions, and performance among countries, the issue of uneven 
representation of labour market outsiders has emerged everywhere, even in the most ‘encompassing’ 
trade union systems such as in Scandinavia. It is clear, therefore, that putting aside institutional and 
political economy issues, there is some underlying tension in the practice of representation itself. It is 
to this that we now turn.  
 
Problematising representation: the dialectic nature of representative claims 
The idea of representation of interests is a central tenet of industrial relations given the complexity, 
asymmetry and indeterminacy of work relations. In this context, the need for collective organisation 
to express and channel employment disputes is central. And yet, only rarely has ‘representation’ been 
at the forefront of industrial relations reflection. The main contributions have come from 
investigations of the practice of representation across countries (Hege and Dufour, 2013) and, 
increasingly, from the perspective of employee voice (Wilkinson et al., 2015). But even in these 
contributions, employee representation (by trade unions, works councils, new actors) has mostly been 
understood through the lens of legal and negotiating representation, where the represented issues have 
a specific mandate such as solving a grievance or bargaining over pay. Yet many industrial relations 
issues – including, but not limited to, labour market dualisation - are complex, continuous political 
issues rather than time-limited and specific. Crucially from the perspective of dualisation, they 
involve the (re)formulation of employee interests and their operationalisation as bargaining objectives 
and priorities, which requires internal (implicit or explicit) mediation among the interests of different 
constituencies. Hence, the need to conceive representation in a more political, rather than legal, sense. 
This in turn can help understand in what sense precarious workers may not be represented: not 
organized, not defined, not actively defended? 
A political reflection on representation is all the more timely as it is representative democracy more 
generally, and not only industrial relations, that has been put into question with increasing vigour in 
the last two decades. Within this context, political scientist Michael Saward (2010) has proposed a 
more dialectic and dynamic approach to representation than the traditional, mechanical one that tends 
to be employed in politics and in industrial relations. The mechanical approach emphasising the 
‘substantive acting for others’ (Pitkin, 1969) is problematic in many ways. It assumes the pre-
existence and unproblematic pre-definition of the ‘others’. But no constituency’s (whether nation, 
society, social class, citizenry…) character and interests can be taken as given without a previous 
process of political definition. A mechanical approach also neglects the ongoing, always problematic, 
dialectic between representative and represented. Finally, it focuses only on the mechanical enactment 
of specific institutional practices, notably elections, to the exclusion of forms of representation that 
are not elected. This is particularly important in industrial relations where elections, while common 
practice, are not universal and are rarely the central source of representativeness and legitimacy (see 
for instance ‘closed shop’ traditions, or the ‘presumed representativity’ by decree of French trade 
unions between 1945 and 2008). Such focus ignores the symbolic, cultural aesthetic dimensions that 
makes representation understandable and legitimate. After all, the etymological sense of ‘re-
presentation’ comes from the arts (figurative and performative), in the sense of ‘making present’ 
something that is not present, through impression.  
The alternative proposal by Saward focuses on the dynamic process of claim-making as constitutive 
of representation. This includes the dialectic between representative and represented, and allows for 
the understanding of non-elective forms of representation such as ‘surrogate representation’ 
(Mansbridge, 2003), whereby representatives bring in interests and perspectives that are technically 
outside their formal territorial representation (e.g. ethnic or sexual minority representatives, claiming 
to represent the views of all of those minorities beyond their electoral districts). In industrial relations, 
this is illustrated by another French example where union ‘mandated delegates’ undertake 
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negotiations in non-unionized workplaces. It is particularly relevant in the case of union activities on 
behalf of atypical (and rarely unionized) workers.  
Non-elective claims may draw on three main arguments (Saward, 2010: 95): deeper roots (e.g. 
representatives claiming affinity and deep familiarity with specific groups), expertise and special 
credentials (the claim most used by established trade unions), and wider interests and new voices (the 
claim generally made by new actors, such as alternative trade unions, but also by anti-union sides). 
The debate on ‘represented’ and ‘non-represented’ workers is largely a debate between three different 
kinds of claims producing different categories and modes of action. 
Here we add a note of caution. Focusing on the process of claim making and consideration of its 
possible performative effects runs the risk of falling into discursive analysis and losing track of the 
institutional and material constraints of employment relations. It does not need to, though. Claim 
making is a 2-way relationship that is always contested and contestable, and contestation draws on 
existing resources, especially when they are institutionalized. Considering claim making is therefore 
compatible with recent approaches to employment relations that advance on institutionalism by 
stressing conflict and dynamic power relations (e.g. Baccaro and Howell, 2017; Meardi, 2018; 
Wailes, et al 2003). 
Representative claims do not create constituencies out of nothing. Rather, they make them visible, and 
provide images and names for them. Saward’s elaboration in this regard is in line with Bourdieu’s 
constructivist sociological intuitions:  
‘in appearance the group creates the man [sic – homme in the French original] who speaks in 
its place – to put it that way is to think in terms of delegation – whereas in reality it is more or 
less just as true to say that it is the spokesperson that creates the group. It is because the 
representative exists, because he represents (symbolic action), that the group that is 
represented and symbolized exists and that in return it gives existence to its representative as 
the representative of the group. (Bourdieu, 1991: 204) 
Other points are important here. First, representative claims made by organisations about workers can 
be positioned along a continuum ranging from representing the working class as a whole, to 
representing a narrowly defined specific employment status, occupation or demographic group (this is 
also complicated by variations in the scope of representation, e.g. health & safety, training, equality).  
Second, representative claims involve both a constituency and an audience, but these do not 
necessarily coincide. They may be partly separate, and in some cases the claimed constituency may be 
much larger than the actual audience (as in the case of small organisations claiming to represent all 
workers of the world), or, vice versa, it may be much smaller. Saward illustrates the latter case with 
the example of a famous trade unionist: Lech Wałęsa, in the 1980s, acted as a representative of 
Gdansk shipyards, but all the people of Poland, and possibly beyond, were his intended audience 
(Saward, 2010: 51). In debates on precariousness too, representative claims may be addressed to 
different audiences (e.g. voters, or political activists) beyond the claimed constituency. 
Saward offers some ways forward within the current crisis of representative democracy, including 
proposals for institutionalising complex representation, which is consistent with the ‘intersectionality’ 
of interests, and attention not only to institutions, but also to the open set of relationships behind them 
(Saward, 2010: 164-165), to argue that ‘the diversity, plurality and variety of representative claims 
supported by a vital system of non-elective claim-making, and the opportunities they provide to 
highlight social and political inequalities, resonate well with (…) the legitimisation of claims (Saward, 
2016: 259). In other words, understanding representative claims can help address the emerging issues 
of the so-called ‘left behind’ and revitalize democracy (including the industrial one).  
 
Representative claims about ‘the Precariat’ 
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In debates on precarious workers, electoral arguments are generally absent, except in internal union 
affairs, where seats are often reserved for specific constituencies. Claims based on membership are 
also rare, which is unsurprising given that unionisation rates of these groups tend to be low. But even 
in the exceptional situations when unionisation is high (e.g. in encompassing union models supported 
by the ‘Ghent system’, which incentivizes membership among groups at higher risk of 
unemployment; or in unions that have successfully organized specific groups such as migrants) 
arguments based on membership representation would be open to the objection that these workers 
may join trade unions to access services, rather than to be represented. It is therefore more useful to 
classify representative claims about precarious workers using Saward’s typology of non-electoral 
claims. This section illustrates how non-electoral representative claims by unions about precarious 
workers have emerged in the last decade. We show how they have competed with other organisations’ 
initiatives in ‘making visible’ precarious workers, and how competing claims dialectically reinforce 
each other. The examples have no ambition of comprehensiveness, or of ‘representativeness’ of 
countries or approaches, and have been selected to maximize variation across countries and sectors. 
 
Expert claims 
Expert claims base their assertion of representativeness on proven specialist expertise and widely-
recognized credentials. In employment relations, they are most likely to be used by traditional trade 
unions which have been accepted for decades as the representative organisations of workers and 
perform on daily basis specialized services to workers. 
For a clear example, we can look at a very well-established union, German metalworkers’ industrial 
organisation IG Metall. In the 2000s, observers had criticized German unions for overlooking their 
own segregation, the growing inequalities among and within sectors, and the process of precarisation 
(Hassel, 2007; Greer and Doellgast, 2007). The crisis of 2008-09 raised awareness that existing forms 
of employment protection (including through co-determination and collective bargaining) defended 
permanent employees but excluded temporary agency workers, who lost over a quarter of their jobs 
(Bosch, 2011; Hassel, 2014). Unions were forced to quickly acknowledge the problem and respond to 
it (Adamy, 2010).  
IG Metall had traditionally resisted the use of agency work, rather than negotiating good conditions 
for agency workers. Post crisis, they had to change approach and increase their efforts to organize and 
defend these workers, which resulted in 35,000 new agency worker members (Benassi and Dorigatti, 
2015). But it is not this extra 4% unionisation of agency workers that makes IG Metall 
‘representative’ in a more substantive way than it was before 2008.  
IG Metall’s efforts involved representative claims in negotiations for new collective agreements with 
temporary work agencies, as well as legal claims in the labour courts. As a result of those claims, the 
Federal Labour Court issued in 2013 two important rulings. The first invalidated the competing 
collective agreements signed with temporary work agencies by the Christian Temporary Work Trade 
Union (Christlicher Gewerkschaften für Zeitarbeit und PersonalService-Agenturen, CGZP), a small 
organization of the Christian Union Federation (Christlichen Gewerkschaftsbund) considered by IG 
Metall to be little more than a ‘yellow’ union. In the second, it increased the competences of work 
councils over the placement of agency workers (Artus, 2014). These claims merged into an 
organisational one, so that the new IG Metall General Secretary could boldly state in his campaign 
book ‘we [IG Metall] have become the union of agency workers’ (Wetzel, 2012: 190).  
The internet documentation posted by IG Metall about its agency worker campaign is telling. A 
webpage of 2013, with the subtitle ‘IG Metall, a reliable partner for agency workers’ opened with 
ethics-based claims (‘IG Metall cares’) but moved swiftly to a focus on expertise, listing collective 
bargaining capacity, political influence over government, and legal representation as reasons why 
precarious workers should join the union (IG Metall, 2013). It then linked to further webpages of 
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information and campaigns over agency work, clearly addressed to a broader and different audience 
than the potential casual worker membership.  
The IG Metall example is replicated in other German union initiatives towards marginal workers, 
including the campaigns for a minimum wage and against bogus self-employment. Through these 
actions the confederal (DGB-associated) trade unions maintained their representative monopoly, and 
even strengthened it through increased social legitimacy (Schmalz and Dörre, 2013) and more 
favourable legislation after 2013.   
Expert claims can be found in many countries. In Britain, the Trades Union Congress established in 
2007 a Commission on Vulnerable Employment to investigate treatment of workers and to uncover 
the worst cases of exploitation. The initiative was informed by recognition of the changing 
demographics of the labour force and that certain groups (e.g. migrant workers) might be more 
susceptible to exploitation (TUC, 2008), but the use of the neutral definition of ‘vulnerable workers’ 
aimed at avoiding divisive targeted policies towards specific groups, and in particular migrants, who 
at the time accounted for the large majority of the estimated vulnerable workers. By performatively 
representing these groups as ‘vulnerable workers’ (a hitherto uncommon term) rather than 
migrant/ethnic minority workers, on whom unions had been focusing (Holgate, 2005; Fitzgerald and 
Hardy, 2010; Anderson et al., 2007; Alberti et al, 2013), the risk of resistance from sections of the 
core membership was minimized: an apparent case of the target audience being different from the 
target constituency.  
Several UK unions also stepped up their efforts on agency workers and self-employed, whose status is 
particularly precarious in the British employment regime, and whose number increased after 2008 
(Forde and Slater, 2014). A series of union campaigns targeted well-known employers (including 
Sports Direct, Uber, Amazon, and some universities) for their use of zero-hour contracts, agency work 
and bogus self-employment. As in Germany, this included legal claims, as in the successful case 
brought by the GMB against Uber in 2016, which awarded drivers the status of workers. In this case, 
the union represented ‘self-employed’ individuals, but as ‘workers’ – redefining their identity in the 
public sphere and ultimately in the legal one too. Interestingly, the GMB, that on line presents itself as 
‘the union for Uber drivers’ (GMB, 2018), has historically organized taxi drivers: in the process, it 
redefined Uber drivers from competitors to fellow workers. 
These representative claim actions deserve attention beyond the widely studied organising activities, 
which, since the TUC founded its Organising Academy in 1998, have largely been in ‘core’ sectors 
and have done little to alleviate structural imbalances in representation (Simms et al., 2013). A further 
example includes Unite’s community-based membership scheme, announced in 2011, to give 
channels of representation to those traditionally not represented through the union movement 
(Holgate, 2013) and which preferred representation in terms of ‘place-based’ communities, rather than 
faith, ethnic or age-based ones. Unite’s Community membership, despite some positive results, has 
not altered the governance structures of the trade union (Wright, 2013) and, in terms of member 
recruitment, has appealed mostly to retired union members.  
In ‘Latin’ countries, the expertise/traditional claim has often taken the form of stressing and 
revamping the tradition of ‘horizontal’, class-based rather than occupation or industry-based forms of 
organisation, that were typical of those union movements’ origins in agricultural societies with mass 
precarious labour employed by the day. A noticeable example is around migrant labour. 
In France, the CGT organized successful strikes of undocumented migrant workers in 2008-10 
through the visible use of the Bourses du Travail (institutions that had long lost most of their 
relevance but survived as visible physical structures) and claimed to represent the sans-papiers 
(undocumented migrants) in their status as workers (Barron et al., 2016). During those campaigns, not 
only did the unions assert that they defend members and non-members alike, as ‘workers’ is the only 
category that matters; they also used the traditional repertoire of occupation strikes to the advantage of 
undocumented migrants. As a higher-level, constitutionally-sanctioned workers’ right, occupation 
strike meant the police could not intervene against protesters despite their ‘illegal’ migration status. 
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While the union’s representative claim was contested (at a time undocumented migrants occupied the 
Bourse du Travail of Paris against the trade union itself), it successfully changed the definition of the 
represented group from ‘sans-papiers’ (as in previous civic protests during the 1990s and early 2000s) 
to ‘workers’. 
In Italy, the role of CGIL horizontal Camere del lavoro (stronger institutions than their French 
counterparts) has been equally important, although more focused on services than on mobilisation. In 
Spain trade unions turned the previous, highly respected centres for information to emigrant workers 
into centres for information to foreign workers, while keeping the same acronym CITE – thereby 
creating a visible identity link between foreign and Spanish (mobile) workers.  
Italy’s three main union confederations also made specific organisational steps towards the growing 
number of precarious workers. In the 1990s, they created specific organizations to represent atypical 
workers and membership is around 200,000, which equates to a unionization rate of about 5% as 
against an official 35% for the total workforce. These organizations (Nidil, Alai-CISL and UIL-Temp) 
achieved only limited results in organizing and collective bargaining, but have gained a public profile 
through some popular campaigns, e.g. in call centres. The largest of them, Nidil (‘New Labour 
Identities’), on its webpage, claims ‘to represent agency and atypical workers’ and immediately adds 
that it fights the use of atypical contracts, in an attempt to redefine atypical workers as employees 
(Nidil, 2018). It then highlights its collective bargaining credentials, and explains how its hybrid 
organisation combines representatives from the traditional industrial unions: a case of what Saward 
(2010) calls institutionalized complex representation. 
  
‘New voices’ claims 
Despite the above-mentioned efforts by traditional unions, the issue of who represents precarious and 
marginal workers remains contested. While in all European countries traditional unions make the 
strongest claims in this regard, their role is increasingly contested by emerging (if not always new) 
organisations that claim to provide channels of representation for voices that are marginalised in large 
trade unions. This happens especially in pluralist representation systems such as the UK and 
Mediterranean countries, while in corporatist countries new actors emerge rarely, as the CGZP 
mentioned above and organisation for refugees in Sweden.  
These alternative voices need not be in direct opposition to trade unions. In the UK, the Living Wage 
Campaign was launched in 2001 by the NGO Citizens UK in collaboration with community 
organisations, churches, charities and, subsequently, sympathetic businesses (Heery et al., 2017), and 
was supported by labour organisations. It did not make explicit representation claims (Citizens UK 
states that it ‘organizes communities to act together for power, social justice and the common good’), 
although it may have indirectly corroborated impressions that traditional unions do not sufficiently 
represent low-paid workers. 
Representation challenges also come from non-union sources and from political parties, proving that 
worker representation has a political dimension, rather than merely interest mediation. In Italy, the 5-
Star Movement, created in 2009, grew to reach 32% in the 2018 national election and form a 
government. It targeted youth and atypical workers explicitly and used anti-union rhetoric, while 
adopting many union demands. By filing parliamentary candidates from humble occupational 
backgrounds, it played the ‘genuine, deeper roots’ representative claim card, but mostly it focussed on 
the ‘new voices’ one as its social roots remain very thin and its organisation occurs mostly on-line. In 
2018 the party leader and new deputy Prime Minister Di Maio issued an employment reform called 
the ‘Dignity Decree’ with the declared aim of defending the interests of precarious workers, and in 
particular those of the ‘gig economy’, against unions’ reservations and with almost no consultation. 
Di Maio declared (29th of July 2018): ‘on the 4th of March [election day] Italians told me to repeal the 
Jobs Act [previous employment law]’ – an example of creative claim that transfers from the political 
electoral arena to the employment relations one and by-passes interest representation. 
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In Spain, the indignados social movement of 2011, while mainly protesting against corrupt 
politicians, also demonstrated against the two main trade unions that were engaged in negotiations 
with the government over employment reform. The protests, with the slogans ‘they don’t represent us’ 
and ‘down with the unions’, forced unions to leave the negotiations, out of fear of being delegitimized 
in the streets. The indignados movement produced a new trade union, Somos (‘we are’: in itself a 
‘direct expression’ claim, but undefined), that remained very small (0.1% of union delegates in 2016), 
as well as a political party, Podemos, which gradually improved the relations with the traditional 
unions while still claiming to speak for the hitherto unrepresented Spanish youth.   
 
‘Deeper roots’ 
Other organisations take a more competitive stance and rather than a ‘wider interests’ stance they 
affirm to be genuine, direct expression of the constituency. Again, there is more institutional space for 
them in pluralist systems. 
In the UK, the new union Independent Workers of Great Britain has led some of living wage 
campaigns and legal cases representing precarious workers, including against large employers such as 
Deliveroo. It does not spare criticism of the larger, established British trade unions, and some of its 
campaigns have been in competition with them. Their claim, on their webpage, focuses on their 
authenticity in being just like the categories of workers they represent: ‘We are the leading union for 
precarious workers. We are migrants, we are the so-called “gig economy”, we are foster care workers. 
We are the IWGB’ (IWGB 2018). In this way, the union rather than limiting its claim to ‘new voice’, 
uses one based on authenticity and on ‘deeper roots’. 
Similar organisations exist in all countries although their effective space is varyingly constrained by 
the functioning of the specific national institutions. Italy has witnessed multiple forms of self-
organization by atypical workers and the self-employed (Armano and Murgia, 2014; Pirro and 
Pugliese, 2015). These experiences occur with varying degree of engagement with trade unions, from 
collaboration to competition to mutual indifference. Some of the most successful experiences are 
among highly skilled self-employed, and have varying orientations from professional to radical. The 
famous case of ‘San Precario’ demonstrations by activists groups such as Chainworkers is particularly 
interesting (Colleoni et al., 2014; Mattoni and Doerr, 2007). It developed explicitly against established 
trade unions (e.g. with alternative May Day celebrations to the official ones run by the large union 
confederations) and it had an effective aesthetic and cultural representation effect, well beyond the 
narrow boundaries and short life of the movement that created it. San Precario’s image is now well-
known also outside Italy (although it is rarely appreciated in full beyond Catholic cultural contexts) 
and it decisively contributed to the establishment of the terms ‘precarious worker’ and ‘precariat’ in 
the English language. The large feminist strikes of the 8th of March in recent years in Spain and Italy, 
led by feminist organisations, also express a direct, unmediated identity, in this case of gender. 
 
‘Non-representation’ claims 
The review of debates would not be complete without paying attention to a different sort of 
representative claims, that are not included in Saward’s typology. These are by actors who stop short 
from claiming that they are the representatives of precarious workers as such, but do strongly argue 
that trade unions are not representatives. Such claims might be defined as ‘non-representation claims’ 
and they have themselves increased in volume since the crisis. In particular, during the labour market 
reforms introduced during the Euro-crisis in Spain and Italy, union opposition was dismissed by most 
governments as insiders’ egoism and neglect of the unemployed. 
French President Nicolas Sarkozy, in the speech starting his failed 2012 re-election campaign, 
reserved his most vigorous attacks to the ‘intermediary bodies’ that make France sclerotic. Trade 
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unions were the first of the list of such ‘bodies’ (before parties, lobbies, experts, commentators) 
accused of creating a barrier between government and people. This kind of claim has the 
characteristics of populism, insofar as it reduces social complexity to unity, and delegitimizes 
representative organisations of specific interests, notably workers (Kriesi, 2014). That claim has been 
repeated in different languages, styles and tones. British Conservative leader Theresa May defined her 
party in 2016 as ‘the workers’ party’ soon after her party had introduced a draconian Trade Union Bill 
based on the claim that unions are not representative.  
There is, finally, another kind of ‘non-representation’ claim that accuses trade unions not for ignoring 
marginal workers, but, on the contrary, for privileging them and forgetting the majority. This is the 
case of some emerging, if still very marginal, far-right worker organisations. In Germany, alternative 
trade unions with links to national populist AfD party and the Islamophobic Pegida movement 
managed in 2018 to gain a handful of works counsellor seats across automotive factories. Their 
argument is that established trade unions, by opening the doors to migrants and protecting them, have 
forgotten German workers, who remain therefore unrepresented. The Northern League in Italy and the 
British extreme right gad made similar attempts at creating alternative nativist unions with no success. 
Such arguments are however more impactful in the political sphere than in the employment relations 
one, with traditional Social Democratic parties suffering heavy losses in recent years, largely to the 
advantage of populist rivals. 
 
Discussion  
This article has contributed to important debates in industrial relations literature by linking two 
discussions that have previously taken place in largely unrelated areas; debates about precarious 
workers, and debates about interest representation. In doing so, we argue that the representative 
claims made by unions and other organisations about representing the interests of precarious workers 
have changed and developed since the crisis. Examining these representative claims through the lens 
of Saward’s framework emphasizes the dialectical nature of interest representation within institutions 
of industrial relations lending further weight to arguments that institutionalist understandings of 
industrial relations need to stress conflict and power dynamics (Wailes et al., 2003, Meardi, 2018, 
Baccaro and Howell, 2017).  
Although we do not claim any broad generalisabilty from the examples chosen, they illustrate some of 
the general tensions within the challenges facing trade unions as the labour force changes. They 
therefore show that representative claims do not emerge from ‘thin air’ but are constructed – 
sometimes out of crisis, sometimes out of a strategic positioning – by key actors. Three actors have 
been shown to be particularly important in this process; trade unions (and peak level organisations), 
precarious workers themselves, and third parties from beyond the sphere of industrial relations who 
make claims that challenge the representative capacity of unions. This both illustrates the empirical 
value of Saward’s (2010) typology and extends it to highlight external actors can shape representative 
claims of trade unions by presenting an explicit and direct challenge to those claims.  
 
Table 1 about here 
 
We have shown that despite profound differences in models of labour market regulation and union 
structures, unions in many institutional settings have becoming increasingly aware of, and explicitly 
opposed to, labour market dualisation. These are highly significant changes that demonstrate 
important changes of strategy and structure in diverse labour markets. In the run-up to and early 
stages of the crisis unions tended to focus on core constituencies. The ‘crisis corporatism’ adopted by 
Germany unions is a particularly clear example, but even here they subsequently focused on 
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organising and campaigning efforts for more vulnerable groups. Italy is legally the most segmented of 
the three labour markets and even here there is a notable reduction in political priority given to insider 
protection which is now perceived as politically difficult to justify. The representative claims of 
Italian trade unions, if not their actual membership, have therefore refocused more on outsiders. 
Competition from other organizations such as of the self-employed in the UK and Italy, populist 
parties and some small radical unions have also contributed to prompting established unions to pay 
attention to precarious workers. This has required established unions to redefine their representative 
claims to appeal to and for both their core constituencies and also a broader political audience. Terms 
such as ‘vulnerable workers’ are helpful to unions as they do not exclude anybody: everybody is 
vulnerable to some extent. In this context, employment status has become more relevant as a category 
for representative claims.   
Expert claims, and opposing ‘non-representation’ claims, have been detected across all different 
institutional settings, if in different forms (e.g. collective bargaining in Germany, horizontal 
organisations in Latin countries, general unions with specialist structures in the UK). This spread 
corroborates the recent observation by Keune and Pedaci (2019) that national intuitions are not so 
prominent, in comparison to sector-level power configurations, in determining unions’ responses to 
precarious work. By contrast, ‘new voices’ and ‘deeper roots’ claims are frequent in pluralist 
representation systems of liberal and Mediterranean countries but seem to be rare in corporatist 
countries. In all countries, though, competition to unions has come from political rights, especially of 
a populist kind, which stresses the importance of a political understanding of representative claims. 
At this point, it is important to return to how these representative claims are linked to debates and 
theories about insiders and outsiders. The different social models across Europe have generated 
uneven representation of precarious and vulnerable workers in unions, politics and associations. This 
does not mean insiders/outsiders theories are correct: the examples discussed illustrate how the 
dividing line between the two is too blurred. ‘Insiders’ do not always act as such, and outsiders rarely 
express interest in opposition to insiders. The weakening of trade unions (as alleged insiders’ 
organisations) has been accompanied by an overall increase of precariousness (Kalleberg, 2018), 
rather than the emergence of a separate social class as the ‘Precariat’ (Standing, 2011), whether in 
itself or, even less, for itself. When traditional trade unions have been suddenly weakened, 
precariousness becomes a bigger problem (e.g. in Germany in the 2000s, UK, Spain and Italy in the 
1980s and 2010s), which is consistent with insights from segmentation theory and power resource 
theory. 
 
Conclusion 
In this article, we have presented examples of representative claims made on behalf of precarious 
workers by unions, new actors and politicians. We have demonstrated the utility of Saward’s 
framework (2010) and shown examples of expert claims, new voices claims and deeper roots claims. 
We have added a fourth empirically-derived category; non-representation claims. The various 
examples indicate that established unions have at moments of crisis to expanded their representative 
claims to precarious workers. At the same time, we see limited evidence of the emergence of a 
precariat class ‘for itself’. There are examples of new actors entering the field to make 
representational claims for precarious workers using ‘deeper roots’ claims of representing precarious 
workers as such, but even these actors fall well short of defining these workers’ interests as opposed 
or competing with those of other workers..  
It remains to be seen whether increased union attention at a time of declining power can have positive 
outcomes for vulnerable workers. Representation claims are dialectic and the ways they are received 
both by those workers and more generally is still unclear. Institutional arrangements will certainly 
play a role in the outcomes for precarious workers, as in the case of the Ghent system facilitating 
higher unionisation of agency workers in Belgium than in Germany (Pulignano et al. 2015). Yet those 
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institutions are clearly not fixed and social relations are able to redefine them. The role of the 
representative claims and challenges made by both new and established actors will be central in how 
institutions of interest representation change and develop in future years.  
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Table 1 – Competing forms of representative claims 
Representative 
claim 
Examples Basis of representative claim Definitions of 
outsiders 
Expert claims Large trade unions 
e.g. IG Metall 
Peak level 
organisations e.g. 
TUC 
Expertise capable to produce 
tangible outcomes through 
strengthening/restoration of 
existing institutional tools (eg 
collective bargaining) 
‘Workers’ 
‘Vulnerable 
workers’ 
New voices 
claims 
New campaigns/ 
political organisations 
e.g. Living Wage, 5-
Star, Indignados 
Neglect of precarious workers 
by established organisation, 
need for new representation 
channels, if with similar  
functions/aims 
Poor, left-
behind, 
exploited 
workers 
Deeper roots 
claims 
New unions/actors 
e.g. IWGB, San 
Precario 
Direct identification through 
genuine roots with different 
categories from traditional 
workforces 
Precariat, gig- 
economy 
workers 
Non-
representation 
claims  
Governments, 
international 
organisations,  
Far right 
Unions representing insiders 
minority and forgetting 
majority 
Citizens, Nation 
 
